In the early days of the Cold War and Decolonisation in Asia, Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister, proclaimed a world vision of neutralism (later called non-alignment) and anti-colonialism. This ran counter to the Anglo-American anxieties regarding the spread of Communism in India and Asia. Despite the historical linkages, constitutional continuities and inter-governmental contacts relations between New Delhi and the West steadily deteriorated. However, there remained an informal group of individuals in Britain and America who maintained their pre-1947 affinity with Nehru and championed his foreign policy orientation to their political establishment. This article focuses on one such ‘friend of India’—the Quaker pacifist Horace Gundry Alexander.

KEYWORDS
Indo-British relations, Horace Alexander, Jawaharlal Nehru, Cold War.

INTRODUCTION
The story of the end of British Indian Empire in August 1947 and its aftermath has been told many times with the focus usually being on the events in the Indian subcontinent. However, the last years of the British Raj and the early years of independent India also saw an extensive interaction between India and initially Britain, then America and then the rest. This interaction was not conducted solely by the respective governments but was also participated in by a group of informal contacts who thus earned the reputation of being a ‘friend of India’.

Horace Gundry Alexander (18 April 1889–30 September 1989) has a special position in this group. As Richard Symonds, his young associate from their time in India in the 1940s, later remembered, Alexander, ‘throughout his long association with the subcontinent, constantly strove to maintain the traditional Quaker capacity to see God in every man and woman’. Alexander was born in Croydon,
England in the same year as his good friend and India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and both went to the same university, Cambridge. Alexander came to India for the first time in 1928; Nehru became the President of the Indian National Congress for the first time in 1929. Over the next decade, Alexander became a close friend of Gandhi and the Congress—in 1942, Gandhi described Alexander as ‘one of the best English friends India has’—and wrote extensively about Gandhi’s personality and philosophy. Indeed, Alexander has been most recently remembered as Gandhi’s Interpreter. Before that, however, he had been presented along with his fellow Quaker Agatha Harrison, rather inaccurately, as an example of ‘an “imperial sensibility”, unable to reconcile themselves to the prospect of a completely independent India’. Still earlier, he had been judged, with his public school and Cambridge University background, as ‘an acceptable face of imperialism’. The Alexander under focus in this article, however, is not the pacifist who served as Gandhi’s interpreter to West but the political activist who served as Nehru’s friend in West, especially but not only on the conflict with Pakistan on Kashmir.

For Alexander’s association with India did not end with its independence in August 1947 or Gandhi’s assassination in January 1948. If anything it deepened and acquired new dimensions as Nehru and his foreign policy of non-alignment emerged and remained for Alexander the prime example of an approach to peace and leadership for a sustainable world order, especially in the then backdrop of the bloc politics of the Cold War. His friendship with the Indian Prime Minister, Nehru’s daughter—Indira Gandhi and his cabinet colleagues gave Alexander a unique vantage from which to represent them to the West while his network in Western capitals, chiefly in London and Washington and also at the United Nations, gave Nehru a personal, informal access to public figures and public opinion in the West. This was particularly true during the Attlee Government (1945–51) in the United Kingdom. Alexander was more than a background emissary though. He was also an influential champion of Nehru and India in the British press. Conversely, he also acted as a touching rod of Western conscience for Nehru and later Indira Gandhi when it came to policy-making in international and, at times, domestic affairs. Thus the ‘significant role played by a relatively unknown pacifist in the transfer of power from a suspicious imperial power to an even more suspicious emerging independent state’ did not end with the emergence of the latter but in fact grew in importance. This article, after a short introduction to Alexander’s career in colonial India, focuses on that role and that relationship.

**CAREER IN COLONIAL INDIA**

Born of ‘Quaker stocks on both sides of his family’, Alexander was a pacifist and an internationalist by temperament and training. He joined Woodbrooke, the Quaker Study Centre in Birmingham, in 1919 to teach international relations and constitutional democracy. Established by the Rugby businessman and Quaker, Frederick Merttens, Woodbrooke, in the wake of the First World War, was a
pioneering attempt in the direction of internationalism. Keen to promote the study of international relations, Alexander established a branch of the League of Nations Union in Bournville and published a book in 1924, *The Revival of Europe: Can the League of Nations Help?* His first brush with Indian concerns came in 1924 when he was persuaded by Gandhi’s friend Charles Freer Andrews to become the joint secretary of a British Committee on India and Opium. Subsequently, he introduced a reprint of Andrews’ articles in the *Manchester Guardian* as a booklet entitled *The Opium Evil in India: Britain’s Responsibility* in 1926. At this time, Alexander—in his own words—‘distrusted the Indian outlook’ and felt there was ‘too much religiosity about it’. Around 1926–27, his fellow Woodbrooker Fritz Berber got Alexander interested in Gandhi and Gandhian politics of ‘conscience’. Andrews had already been anxious that Alexander should come and see India for himself and so in July 1927, a curious Alexander set off for India, via Central and Southern Europe, Egypt and Aden. The visit had an explicit purpose too: to report on the working of controls on the sale and trade of opium in India.

Once there, he visited Santiniketan, Rabindranath Tagore’s ashram in rural Bengal. It was this visit to Santiniketan and the ‘great impression’ that Tagore made on him that was ‘decisive in converting Alexander to the nationalist cause’. As it was, his trip had coincided with ‘a vigorous renewal of nationalist campaigning against the appointment of the statutory commission chaired by Sir John Simon to consider Indian constitutional development because of its exclusion of any Indian members’. Meeting Gandhi in this backdrop in April 1928, Alexander found a leader ‘more dependable and inspiring than anything he had known before’. He concluded that the ascetic Gandhi was an ‘ideal Quaker’ who, along with the aesthetic Tagore, was working for the growth of a strong, enlightened people.

From June 1928 onwards, Alexander became a vocal and prolific supporter in England of Gandhi’s leadership of the Indian national movement. In August 1929, he made contact with V.K. Krishna Menon to help develop the India League. In May 1930, he introduced the special session of the Friends’ Yearly Meeting in which Tagore, who had come to deliver the Hibbert Lectures in Oxford, condemned British rule in India as ‘a life-destroying machine’. In August 1930, he went back to India to approach Gandhi and the British Viceroy Lord Irwin for reconciliatory talks, which eventually led to the Gandhi–Irwin Pact of 1931 and Gandhi’s attendance at the Second Round Table Conference in London later the same year. It was this particular mission which heralded Alexander’s career as an effective interlocutor between the British Government and the Indian National Congress, for it was supported by the wider body of Friends as well as sanctioned by the Secretary of State for India, Wedgwood Benn. In October 1931, this career was institutionalised with the formation of the India Conciliation Group in London with Gandhi’s blessings. For the rest of the 1930s, Alexander published three pamphlets on India, *Indian prisoners: A Case for Enquiry and an Opportunity for Progress* (1933), *Political Prisoners in India* (1937) and *Congress Rule in India* (1938) and earned for himself a reputation with the British India Office as ‘an irredeemably hostile partisan of Congress’.

During the first years of the Second World War, Alexander was heavily involved in efforts to bring about a fresh understanding between the Congress and the Churchill Government although to the Secretary of State for India Leo Amery and Viceroy Linlithgow he was a ‘nuisance—overtly political with excessive zeal’. In January 1942, he suggested the name of Stafford Cripps to the India Office as the right man to go to India and parley with the Congress, given Cripps’ close relationship with the Congress leaders, chiefly Nehru. This may very well have contributed to London’s decision to send Cripps, then Britain’s Ambassador in Moscow, to New Delhi in March. In June 1942, Alexander himself came to India as a part of the Friends’ Ambulance Unit to organise protection against Japanese air raids on Bengal, given the Unit’s experience of civil defence work in the London blitz. This was followed by famine relief work and Alexander remained in Bengal for fifteen months. In 1944, he published *India since Cripps*, resigned from Woodbrooke and decided to go to America to help enhance interest in India there. His stay in America between March and August 1945 was primarily to win financial support for Indian relief and rehabilitation but it also coincided with the San Francisco conference which saw the establishment of the United Nations Organisation. Alexander returned to a Britain in which his Labour Party friends Clement Attlee, Cripps, Philip Noel-Baker and Frederick William Pethick-Lawrence were in power. The latter, now Secretary of State for India, prevailed upon his officials and allowed Alexander to go to India in December 1945. Subsequently, along with Agatha Harrison, Alexander maintained a conspicuous presence in the background of the Cabinet Mission negotiations over March–July 1946 to the irritation of the Viceroy Wavell. Alexander remained in India till March 1948. In this period, he was chiefly involved in relief and rehabilitation in Bengal (August 1946–September 1947), Punjab (September–October 1947) and Kashmir (November 1947–January 1948).

It was this career in the colonial era which deservedly earned for Alexander the sobriquet ‘friend of India’ and helps explain his post-independence significance. The following excerpt from a letter Alexander wrote to his good friend, the Tory politician, Richard Austen Butler, reflects well Alexander’s views on Nehru, Congress and independent India (and Pakistan) and provides a starting point for this treatment of the man and his activities. Writing six months before the transfer of power in India, Alexander exuded optimism in independent India and its leadership:

> My impression is that responsibility [of heading the Interim Government] is having a very sobering effect on Pandit Nehru, and I think he has wise colleagues in both Rajendra Prasad and Rajagopalachari—with the latter I keep in pretty close touch. Nor would I underestimate the importance of the strong and rugged qualities of Patel. He is perhaps less conciliatory to the Muslims than some of his other colleagues but I am sure he will never be afraid to take whatever measures may be necessary to uphold order and good government. I wish I could see among the [Muslim] League leaders, men of such integrity and strength as some of these men. I am afraid there may be considerable difficulties before India gets through the transition period but I have great confidence in her capacity to build a vigorous independent life.
If, as seen above, Alexander pinned his hopes domestically on Nehru and his team to steer India though the difficult transition then he also had high hopes for India internationally. Nehru embellished these further by convening the first Asian Relations Conference in Delhi in March 1947. This impressive affirmation of the emergence of a new idea of the postcolonial world, standing apart from the bloc politics of the early Cold War and anticipating the policy of non-alignment which was to become influential in the 1950s, had a favourable impact on Alexander. Further, on the specific issue of the India–Pakistan dispute on Kashmir, Alexander had a good estimate of the Kashmiri leader Sheikh Abdullah, which was at variance with the views of the new Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) where his fellow Quaker and old friend from Cambridge, Philip Noel-Baker, had become the Minister. This led to awkwardness in their relationship. As Alexander wrote to Noel-Baker in March 1948, ‘It is difficult not to become unwittingly a partisan of one side against the other’. But he held steadfastly to his position that ‘the Kashmiri leader has and will have to be reckoned with’ and saw it as one of his tasks to make London, Washington and New York (United Nations) see Abdullah in a better perspective. When he went back to London and met Noel-Baker in April, the latter was ‘hostile’ and bitterly complained about his biased Indian ‘friends’ to Alexander. Notwithstanding his friendship with Noel-Baker, Alexander continued to feel that the new CRO was a kind of ‘old India Office writ large’ and indefatigably countered, what he felt, was their ‘permanent prejudice’ against India.

**EARLY 1950S**

The roots of Alexander’s support for Nehru and Congress went back, as can be surmised from above, deep into his pre-1947 association with them. He had recognised their ‘ancient sense of distrust’ against the British and sympathised with their ‘painful recollection’ of the years in which ‘the Muslim League made the job of repression by the British easier’. But equally, he now found himself in easy agreement with Nehru’s ‘instinctive’ backing of the Soviet Union as well as his efforts to forge the ‘important’ relationship with China—despite the Anglo-American antipathy and suspicions of Stalin’s and Mao’s regimes. He remained in India, largely in Bengal, over 1949–51 ‘labouring effectively in his own quiet way’ when in March 1950 India and Pakistan came close to war over the treatment of minorities in both the Bengals and saw their movement from one side to the other. Alongside, he was reporting on the deteriorating food situation in some parts of India, notably Bihar, as well as observing the Naga independence movement, near the-then Burma border, against Indian sovereignty. He was also cheering Agatha Harrison from afar as she went around Whitehall supporting Nehru’s rather independent line towards a truce on the Korean War (1950–53), which had not pleased the Americans. Sending the testimony of a ‘man on the spot’, he implored her to
...see Attlee or Morrison or someone really high up about the Kashmir business... the British line seems to me utterly shocking. It will simply tend to drive India straight into the arms of the Communists... What with delays over food gifts from America and the Kashmir resolutions, Nehru’s line of honest, independent friendship with the Western Powers is becoming more and more unpopular [in India].

In 1952, Alexander produced a small book on Kashmir, *Kashmir: A Statement of Facts and Problems*, written largely for a Western audience. It was a response to his feelings that ‘Western reactions to the Kashmir trouble—after all, a family quarrel—[had] little understanding of it but much censorious condemnation of one side or the other—perhaps even of both’. The book was notable as, distinguishing Kashmiri interest from Indian interest, it recognised that ‘the Government or Governments of Kashmir are not parties to the negotiations’ and acknowledged the Kashmiri grievance that ‘every interest is considered except [that] of the Kashmiri people’.

Alexander left India as a base, though of course he would make several visits, in March 1954. Nehru attended his farewell party at the Quaker Centre in Delhi. Both Alexander and Nehru were ‘aware that there was a great deal more to be done for India in Britain and, back in Birmingham, Alexander lost no time in settling into his role as champion of India’s foreign policy at the height of the Cold War’. Almost immediately upon his return, he locked horns with Noel-Baker who had denounced Nehru’s neutralism as ‘unwise and immoral’—terms which suited, and indeed were used by, the moralising Cold Warrior John Foster Dulles, American Secretary of State (1953–59), better than the Quaker pacifist Noel-Baker. Standing up for Nehru’s ‘dynamic neutralism’, Alexander was rather scathing in his response: ‘To describe his policies as immoral is a reflection, not on him, but on your own powers of understanding the Asian world’.

In the early 1950s, following the NATO model, America and Britain embarked upon a series of military pacts against the Soviet Union in the Middle East and South East Asia, a process which culminated in the creation of the Manila (1954) and Baghdad (1955) Pacts subsequently becoming SEATO in 1955 and CENTO in 1958, respectively. Echoing Nehru’s opposition to these, Alexander argued that there was neither any need nor any support for such organisations in Asia and ‘those who said they wanted it did so because they thought it would help them get the aid they wanted’, like Pakistan against India. Not only was he quick to point out the ‘shattering effect’ in India and ‘wider repercussions’ in the-then East Pakistan where his old friend H.S. Suhrawardy was against such military aid from America which they felt only benefitted West Pakistan, he was clear-sighted enough to conclude that ‘hardly anyone in either India or Pakistan regards it in [anti-Communist] light... Now West Pakistan [feels that it] will be able to force India out of Kashmir. And of course the opposite side of this is to stiffen India.’

This stiffening of the Indian attitude was confirmed to Alexander by Nehru himself in February 1954: ‘There were no prospects of immediate talks with Pakistan...which have been delayed solely by the US–Pakistan agreement’. Alexander agreed with Nehru that ‘Mohammad Ali [Pakistan Prime Minister] must now convince [India] that this US aid does not alter Pakistan’s military strength in
relation to Kashmir’. Sharing this with Agatha Harrison, an anxious Alexander concluded: ‘It is most important that no one should internationally raise the Kashmir issue in such a way so as to exasperate Jawaharlal Nehru. No outside action can assist and might only disturb and delay.’

However, the Indian intransigence against third-party/international intervention in Kashmir proved difficult to sell abroad. Alexander worried at ‘how easy it is for the Indian case to be misunderstood and misinterpreted’, was ‘grieved to note a readiness in certain quarters to disregard India’s case and undermine her position’ and felt shocked ‘to observe the attitude quite widely adopted in England today towards India in general and Mr Nehru in particular’. Over the next few years, he engaged in an ‘honest endeavour’ in public and press explaining Nehru’s foreign policy in a milieu which for the most part insisted on seeing international relations in terms of Communism and anti-Communism. Apart from articles in The Friend and letters to The Times, this also included his book Consider India (1954). In this period, though, he suffered the loss of ‘his most effective ally in this work’. Agatha Harrison died in Geneva on 7 May 1954. Writing to an Indian friend sometime later, Alexander remembered how ‘no doors [had been] closed to the absolutely tireless’ Harrison without whom he and other who continued with their efforts to bring India and England closer were a ‘poorer lot’.

In February 1955, disturbed by the lack of urgency on Nehru’s part to get on with the job of settling Kashmir with Pakistan, Alexander again became anxious for outside mediation between India and Pakistan. Writing to Isobel Cripps (wife of Stafford), he asked, ‘Can it be that he [Jawaharlal] knows them [the Pakistanis] a little too well—in just the sense that the Americans are sure they know the Russians only too well?’ In the same vein, he reminded himself of what Rajagopalachari had once said to him and others, the ‘over-anxious ones from the West’, who had asked what they could do during some crisis in India: ‘you can pray’. Determined to do more than pray, Alexander wrote to Pakistan’s High Commissioner in London, Ikramullah, offering his services to talk to Nehru. Giving a glimpse of his driving impulses, he mentioned first his sense as an Englishman that ‘we English still have some responsibility to try and improve the relations between India and Pakistan’, then recalled that ‘Mr Gandhi had said just the same thing to me about Kashmir in particular a week or two before his death and in doing so he made it clear that he thought I myself might be able to do something’ and ended with the claim that ‘I seem to be able to talk quite straight to Mr Nehru about Kashmir without making him angry and judging from what other people have said about their experiences with him, I think that may be something’. Ikramullah’s reply was polite but uncompromising. Thanking Alexander for his kind interest and offering to meet anytime, Ikramullah simply repeated Pakistan’s lack of faith in Nehru’s attitude, its determination not to abandon Kashmir, its confidence that the vote there would not go against Pakistan and its warning that sooner or later there would be a conflict if Nehru denies plebiscite. Ikramullah put it plainly, ‘unless India is prepared to agree to hold a free and impartial plebiscite, I do not see how you or anybody can help us’.
Alongside this attempt, as seen above, Alexander had continued to press India’s case in the largely unsympathetic and at times hostile British press. He shared his frustration and disappointment at his efforts being misrepresented and bearing little fruit with the Indian Prime Minister and received a remarkably bitter reply from his friend:

I must confess that I have been greatly disturbed. I do not mind what the Beaverbrook Press says. But the kind of news appearing in the London Times has been amazingly tendentious and actuated with deliberate malice. I entirely agree with you that the old mentality continues in certain British circles. There is resentment at the fact of India’s independence. British policy in Asia [and the Middle East] appears to me [to be] completely out of date. They deal with old type of Ministers who have no influence with their people. The result is that outwardly they make pacts and alliances with a government but…at the cost of irritating the people of that country. The Americans follow the same foolish policy. How can one bring these people up-to-date? All the good work done by the US in India is forgotten and only this fact remains that the US is supporting Portugal in Goa. In the same way, the Baghdad Pact has irritated people here exceedingly and chiefly against the UK Government.63

Unlike Ikramullah, Pakistan and most observers in the West, Alexander continued to believe that ‘Nehru in his heart wants to have the free vote in Kashmir but…only…if Pakistan “plays fair”… He thinks that they have been deceiving him, just as sincerely as they think that he is the villain.’ Going back to his pet characterisation of the Kashmir dispute as a family quarrel, a dispute between ‘two brothers who both are quite sure that they know the other far better than any outsider can and therefore reject outside aid’, Alexander set out to his fellow Quakers that their task was three-fold: (1) ‘How to keep Nehru to his own best instincts and convince him of the bonafides of the Pakistan Government?’, (2) ‘[How] to get a compromise accepted in Pakistan?’, and (3) ‘[How to convince Western] men who meet Nehru…that they are dealing with an honest man of faith and statesmanship who can be brought to an agreement?’64 With Kashmir, Alexander’s difficulty ‘was not so much the absence of idealism as the presence of global strategic interests’ because of Kashmir’s geographical situation,65 although as time passed, he did get increasingly critical of Nehru’s ‘appallingly patronising attitude’ towards Pakistan.66

1956–57

The two years of 1956 and 1957 represented, arguably, the nadir of Jawaharlal Nehru’s strained relations with his Western counterparts. Events in Suez, Hungary and Kashmir all contributed to this worsening spell. His sister Vijayalakshmi Pandit, India’s High Commissioner in London (1954–61), regularly wrote to Alexander in this period about the ‘difficult and delicate’ relations.67 This made any progress on Alexander’s three-fold tasks that much more difficult to attain. The Cold War configuration had seen Pakistan take advantage of it by becoming the ‘good boy’ helping the Baghdad Pact.68 This had the effect of Nehru digging his heels on Kashmir and other questions which further alienated him from the
West. Christopher Birdwood, a former British Indian Army officer, who had written a book on Kashmir spoke for a majority when he told Alexander that he could not absolve Nehru from an extremely obstructionist attitude in his refusal to allow a free choice [in Kashmir]. For people like myself who want to believe in Nehru, it is sad to see him weaken himself in the eyes of international public opinion. 69

On his part, Nehru’s bitterness with Britain, or at least its ‘official mind’, sections of the Tory press and the Eden Government, also deepened. He kept up a steady correspondence with Alexander who regularly sought influential political figures and forwarded Nehru’s grievances. Patrick Gordon-Walker, Minister at the CRO in succession to Noel-Baker under Attlee’s Labour Government and another old Nehru sympathiser, was one of those who, in his own words, ‘preached in and out of season the need for us [UK] to win and keep the confidence of India’ and remained grateful for Alexander’s link with the Indian Prime Minister. Gordon-Walker shared ‘a good deal’ of Nehru’s bitterness and was inclined to agree that ‘English people who take great pride in Indian independence…are more in evidence when Labour is in office’. But even he told Alexander that ‘Nehru must realise that many of his friends do not understand his refusal to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir’. 70

In India, on the other hand, Rajagopalachari was proposing that India should immediately leave the British Commonwealth. Alarmed Quakers resolved to rally around India in this period of ‘a new strain’. Nehru’s comparatively moderate language in speaking about the Soviet invasion of Hungary vis-à-vis the Anglo-French involvement in Suez had angered people and Alexander feared that ‘people’s mind are getting very much diverted from the Middle-East because of this—I am afraid that Nan [Vijayalakshmi Pandit] will find a new kind of hostility to India—I hear that there is a clique among the Tories who actually want to turn India out of the Commonwealth because of her sympathy with Egypt’. 71 The other obvious consequence was the effect of this worsening of relations on the enduring Kashmir question. One such old Tory with an axe to grind was Olaf Caroe.72 Caroe now declared in The Times that ‘those who have dealt with Mr Nehru will be in no doubt that…the main spring of this thought and action is to avoid, indeed prevent, anything effective being done to enforce a resolution of the Kashmir dispute’. 73

Alexander rose in gallant defence of his friend. Pouring scorn over Caroe’s claim of ‘dealing with’ Nehru and comparing it unfavourably with his own long association with the Indian Prime Minister, Alexander thought it ‘absurd’ that anyone can ‘interpret the main spring of Mr Nehru’s highly complex mind’. Then, contrary to Caroe’s implication, Alexander called Kashmir more of an obsession with Pakistan, albeit ‘for very understandable reasons’, than with Nehru. Finally, coming to the main point of his argument, Alexander suggested that central to Nehru’s mind, in the aftermath of Suez and Hungary, was the thought that ‘the Great Powers still believe that there is one law for them and another for the smaller and “younger” nations’. This meant, with specific reference to Kash-
mir, that ‘he is likely to resist any proposal for international intervention in a small
country which the Great Powers would not tolerate in their own territories’.74

Across the Atlantic, the Indian Prime Minister’s American sympathisers were
feeling helpless in front of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his pact-
politics.75 They held Dulles in poor esteem and kept alive their contacts among
the Democratic opposition, most notably with the former, popular American
Ambassador to India (1951–53), Chester Bowles. The latter had no compunction
in calling Dulles and his policies ‘even more inept than usual’ in this period—in
India, the Middle East and Africa.76 But Bowles could do nothing except hope
that the Democrats would win in the November 1956 Presidential election which
looked unlikely and thus was left ‘rather discouraged about the prospect for any
improvement’ in the near future. One sliver of hope in this gloomy sky was
Nehru’s forthcoming visit to America in December 1956. Alexander, Pandit and
the Labour leaders all looked upon the visit as ‘the supreme opportunity’. But the
visit was shadowed by the presence of the irrepressibly anti-American Krishna
Menon, India’s face and voice at the UN for much of the 1950s. Writing to his
fellow Quaker Elmore Jackson in New York about Nehru’s visit, a worried
Alexander added a word about Menon:

You know him well and you know that he has two aspects. The prickly aspect—as
Agatha once called it—has been all too apparent on several occasions lately. I am
convinced that you and the Baileys are among the few people who can really help
him to relax and present his better nature to America…77

Alexander’s worries were hardly unfounded. Grace Lankester—no critic of
Menon, in fact a close friend and sympathiser—was reporting from New York
that ‘he does spoil his work by his intemperate tongue. No one can be more
unpopular. It is not good for India’s sake in UN. He seems to go out of his way
to be rude which does not help…and needs people who helped him to be
moderate.’78 Lankester hoped that Alexander would do his bit and have a quiet
talk alone with Nehru in London when the Indian Prime Minister passed en
route to America. They had no illusions that their friend was going to be
challenged on Hungary, Egypt, Israel, the Soviet Union and Kashmir. Not only
did Alexander do all he could with Nehru, he also continued to emphasise to
Elmore Jackson and Sydney Bailey to see Menon and ‘induce him to be his best
self’ at the UN.79

January 1957 was an especially fraught month for Indo-British relations. Britain
had sponsored a resolution at the UN Security Council paving the way for a dis-
cussion on Kashmir. To thwart it, Krishna Menon embarked upon an eight-hour-
long stint of filibustering in vain as the Security Council passed the resolution and
established the Gunnar Jarring mission, the last UN intervention in the dispute.
Alexander, of course, did not take any part in this sequence of events in New
York. Instead, he found himself re-visiting the events of 1947–48 and taking up
cudgels on India’s behalf in a controversy conducted through correspondence with
his old sparring partner on Kashmir and India–Pakistan relations, Noel-Baker.
The two friends again went over the issues of invasion, accession and plebiscite
resolutions, exchanged charges on behalf of their friends and expressed astonishment at each other’s statements of history. Interestingly, coming from opposite directions, they found things to agree upon, things which illustrate the centrality of the personality of Nehru and reactions to him represented by Alexander and Noel-Baker: one, that ‘Jawaharlal Nehru was extremely like the upright Britisher’ and two, that he had had a ‘unanimously denunciatory press’ in Britain in this period. While desiring the British and American governments to ‘make a drive on it [Kashmir] as hard as they can’, Noel-Baker expected Alexander to use his influence with an ‘idiotic’ Nehru on ‘Krishna’s legal stuff’ on Kashmir.80

Alexander did try to use his influence but not with Nehru. Instead, he came up with a quaint idea. Remembering Gandhi’s visit to England in 1931 and drawing inspiration from it, he wanted Rajagopalachari to come to England on a goodwill visit. Before approaching the old man, Alexander sought advice from some of his Indian friends. To his surprise, it did not evoke the kind of response, let alone endorsement, which he had expected. Vijayalakshmi Pandit, in a ‘personal and very confidential letter’, did not think it would be a good idea: ‘like and yet unlike 1931, only Rajaji [Rajagopalachari] is not Gandhiji’.81 Devdas Gandhi, Gandhi’s son and Rajagopalachari’s son-in-law, while separately alluding to Rajagopalachari’s disagreement with some of Nehru’s policies and his sometimes sharp critical statements, too had objections but his had more to do with his concern that ‘the British Government may not take kindly to Rajaji’s visit in the wake of his caustic criticism of its attitude on Suez and Kashmir [as well as its apparent] vengeance against everybody who opposed Suez’.82

Thus discouraged, Alexander nevertheless continued writing ceaselessly to friends in India and America and meeting people in England in this—what he called—period of ‘painful relations between India and England’. One of these old, close friends was Amrit Kaur (1889–1964), of the princely state of Nabha, friend and associate of Edwina Mountbatten, and Health Minister (1947–57) in successive cabinets of Nehru. Unburdening himself to her, Alexander painted a dismal picture, for Indian prospects and the odds facing friends of India: the CRO—‘reflecting the policies of its [Tory] political chiefs’; the English press—‘deplorable and shockingly unwilling even to see that India has a case over Kashmir’; the Pakistanis—‘extremely clever and diligent’ in presenting their side; and the Macmillan Government—‘pro-Pakistan’.83

Amrit Kaur, who herself and her family had been more or less born and bred in England and who claimed to love England more than anybody else in India, sent a lengthy reply which contained all the elements of hurt carried by Nehru and Congress against their former rulers: ‘same old manners’—among the politicians; ‘wrong partition’—blamed on the British; ‘biggest wrong’—paramountcy over the Princely States; Pakistan’s invasion of Kashmir—‘completely forgotten by everybody’; ‘America wants military bases against possible communist aggression’; ‘UK wants Pakistan to toe the line in Middle East’; ‘poor, peaceful, friendly-to-all India’; ‘vilest of vile—Pakistani press’; ‘prejudiced UK absolutely ignores facts and misleads the US too’; ‘completely warped Macmillan government’; ‘tragedy that
the UK has allowed the USSR to win an easy diplomatic victory’; and, above all, a self-righteous belief in India’s moral correctness and truthfulness over partition of assets, water dispute, Kashmir versus Pakistan’s incitement to hatred, indulgence in violence, awful lies and propaganda. She ended with a plea to Alexander: ‘I know we have many friends in England but I wish some of them would speak out more strongly than they do’.

One of these friends was inside the corridors of power. Malcolm MacDonald, the British High Commissioner to India (1955–60), had undertaken a timely trip back home to meet his political masters and reassure them about Nehru and his enduring friendliness to Britain. Isobel Cripps and Alexander met MacDonald and ‘came away feeling a good deal less gloomy’ but Alexander could not oblige Amrit Kaur with a strong pronouncement. One of the reasons was the new Prime Minister of Pakistan, H.S. Suhrawardy, who was not merely well known to Alexander from his Bengal famine relief work days (1943–44) but one he counted as a friend. So while he continued with his efforts to readjust the balance of opinion against India, it would now be awkward for him to do so in a major key. Suhrawardy, on his part, was keen to ‘renew our close contacts’. Inviting Alexander to Pakistan as ‘a state guest’, he struck a practical note regarding the ‘foolishness of war [on Kashmir with] a far more powerful India’ and wanted Alexander’s help as ‘a man of goodwill’ to persuade Nehru and strengthen the UN’s latest effort (the Jarring Mission) to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir.

The American Quakers, led by Elmore Jackson, too wanted Alexander to ‘go to Pakistan and do your best to help Suhrawardy’. They had been impressed by Suhrawardy as a ‘man of peace’ and felt that he had ‘consistently gone a considerable length [on] the moderate path’. Also, they had not been ‘impressed with [Krishna Menon’s] handling of the Kashmir question’. Indeed, their disillusionment with their friend’s effectiveness in representing India on Kashmir was now near-total. While continuing to believe that ‘Nehru did have a conscience on Kashmir’, they questioned whether ‘Krishna has a future here or not’. Nevertheless, despite this personal tug from the opposite direction and increasing disenchantment with Menon, Alexander continued in his efforts to interpret India to the CRO. He did meet Nehru once in this period to request him to meet Suhrawardy but all he got for his trouble was a blunt denunciation of Suhrawardy as an ‘unprincipled ruffian’, his government ‘a gangster government’ and Pakistan ‘violently anti-Indian just like Muslim League used to live on anti-Congress principle’. Alexander could only reflect later that Suhrawardy was not that much different from the troika of Tito-Nasser-Khrushchev but ‘Nehru does not deal with him like he deals with Tito-Nasser-Khrushchev because of a blind spot [for the latter]’. Meanwhile, he sent a rather vivid account of his challenges and efforts to Jackson, which compares the Indian diplomatic effort with its Pakistani counterpart, reveals the key fault lines of the Cold War in South Asia in the late 1950s and shows Alexander in full flight—grasping the issues, tactically aware and judge of men:
I am in increasingly close contact with the man at our CRO who has to take the main initiative in advising on India and Pakistan and I like him. He has only recently been transferred to this post, so it is all new to him, and I think he is quite acutely conscious at present of the need for great circumspection. We have constantly to face the fact that the Pakistanis are for ever on the doorstep of our important departments, gently insinuating their view of things...are they not in the Baghdad Pact, and so on. India does not adopt these tactics and so their case [is] less understood and appreciated.90

LATER YEARS AND LESSER ISSUES

Apart from Kashmir, there were three other significant conflicts involving India in which Alexander involved himself. On each of these issues, India faced strong criticism in the West as Alexander tried to present the Indian case. The first issue was that of the Portuguese conclave of Goa. Alexander and some other Friends had formed a Goa sub-committee of the Friends Peace Committee in early 1956 to mediate between India and Portugal. The previous year, 1955, there had been tension in Goa and this had been in response to that. But with Nehru withstanding pressure to take action and little encouragement from either London or Lisbon or even the Vatican, to whom an approach was made, the committee lapsed.91 After a few years’ lull, in December 1961, India mounted an armed action in Goa to terminate the Portuguese rule for which the non-violent Nehru was heavily criticised with the charge of hypocrisy. A ‘disappointed’ Alexander, nevertheless, pointed out the ‘brutal’ nature of the Portuguese colonial regime, Angolan nationalist revolt against Portugal in 1961 and domestic and international pressure against such vestiges of colonialism by way of a defence of Nehru.92

The second was the so-called Naga question.93 Alexander had first, albeit fleetingly, encountered the Naga aspirations to independence from the Indian Union in 1950 but he involved himself properly only a decade later. In April 1960, he produced a report regretting the tendency of Indian officialdom to treat the Nagas as an ‘inferior nuisance’ and argued the need for a mediator between the Nagas and New Delhi. Over a five-year period from 1963 to 1968, the Quakers, especially Marjorie Sykes, were involved in a peace mission.94 The third issue was the steady deterioration in Indo-China and Indo-Pakistan relationships, the former of which led to India’s defeat in the border war with China in October 1962. Visiting India exactly a year after, Alexander was saddened to see Nehru in terminal decline. As for the latter issue of Indo-Pakistan relations, which would eventually lead to a military conflict in September 1965, it put a severe strain on Alexander’s role as the elder statesman involved with both the countries.95 For he found that not all Quakers shared his enthusiasm for Nehru’s leadership and in fact there was an increasing tendency to question the Indian Prime Minister’s conduct, especially towards China. Many felt that it had been obvious that a swap of territory was what the Chinese had been keen on, at least since 1956 if not earlier, and it was India that had gradually veered away from this, ‘half-justifying it by public opinion, half [by] Nehru’s own shifting position’.96 Disillusioned, they held
misrepresentation of each other's views and psychological attempts to come to
terms with their respective British pasts (interactions in the case of China) primarily responsible for the fracas and not a deceitful China bent on humiliating India.

In the wake of the Indo-China conflict and in the face of the Anglo-American pressure to reach a settlement with Pakistan on Kashmir and related matters, Nehru agreed to Ministerial-level talks between India and Pakistan over December 1962–May 1963, to be followed by a summit meeting with the Pakistani President Ayub Khan. James Bristol reporting to the Quakers in February 1963 was not hopeful of a solution for he found ‘tremendous resistance’ in India to any Western pressure on Kashmir. Bristol wrote, ‘India’s need for Western military assistance is transparently clear but she does not want to find strings attached to her acceptance of this military aid’.97 One thing was clear to the friends of India everywhere: ‘India’s position as a leader of the non-aligned nations of the world, committed neither to East nor to West, and therefore able to exert an impartial and reconciling influence between the two powers in the Cold War, is a thing of past’.98 Later when the Ministerial-level talks failed and the Anglo-American ‘mediator’ formula fizzled, Alexander and other Friends held the Americans and the British responsible for acting precipitately and coercively—tactics which in their experience had never achieved anything with Nehru.99

Jawaharlal Nehru passed away on 27 May 1964. In a moving letter of condolence to Nehru’s sister, Alexander fondly remembered ‘the unique role in world affairs which India owed’ to its first Prime Minister.100 In April, before he passed away, Nehru had released the Kashmiri leader Sheikh Abdullah and sent him to Pakistan for talks but his death arrested any further developments. Abdullah did not enjoy the same kind of trust and rapport with Nehru’s successors and was arrested by the Lal Bahadur Shastri Government in 1965 for having met with the Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai, apart from making speeches which the public opinion in India took a dim view of.101 Alexander took up cudgels on behalf of the man he had known for almost two decades and wrote to Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi. In his public writings, Alexander had agreed with Abdullah and endorsed either a condominium or a confederation for Kashmir.102 In her reply, Indira Gandhi presented the picture of an inflamed country, about which Alexander or anybody else, herself included, could do little to help:

I am afraid the feelings are still running so high here that no one is prepared to listen to a different point of view… What Sheikh Sahib does not realise is that with the Chinese invasion and the latest moves in and by Pakistan, the position of Kashmir has completely changed…103

Like many others, Alexander too had been concerned with the question After Nehru, Who?104 In 1960, he had wanted his old Gandhian associate Jayaprakash Narayan (JP)105 to return to active politics with an eye to Nehru’s succession. He had sent Stella Alexander (no relation) to talk with him. JP had assured Stella, and through her Alexander, that he was not “out of politics” only out of party politics.106 He had also caused them concern by casually mentioning ‘the possibility of Krishna Menon pulling off a “coup” when Nehru retires…with the help of
the army’. The Quakers shared JP’s fear that if this happened then, under the anti-American Krishna, India’s ties with the West would be severed. When JP had mentioned Morarji Desai, another of Alexander’s Congress acquaintances from the 1940s, as the most probable successor to Nehru, Stella had reminded him that his own stock was very high in India. JP had ‘agreed and without saying so specifically, indicated that he would be ready to respond to a call from the country’. Nothing, of course, came of this exchange as Nehru was succeeded by Lal Bahadur Shastri, whose sudden death left the way open for Indira Gandhi to become Prime Minister in January 1966.

During her regime, in 1971–72, Alexander kept abreast of the deterioration in India–Pakistan relationship, the subsequent war and the consequent birth of Bangladesh, the Simla Summit and the following discussions on the prisoners of war through his correspondence with JP and, on the Pakistan side, with Foreign Minister Aziz Ahmed, among others. In between, he made his last trip to India in November 1971 to take part in the CF Andrews centenary celebrations. Both JP and Aziz Ahmed, for very different reasons, requested Alexander to involve himself in the cause of nuclear disarmament, especially after the May 1974 nuclear explosion by India. After the imposition of internal emergency (June 1975–March 1977) by Indira Gandhi, a concerned Alexander corresponded with Indian officials, her former Foreign Secretary and then Ambassador to America, T.N. Kaul, and her speechwriter H.Y. Sharda Prasad. He remarked to Kaul that the autocratic ‘emergency’ reminded him of the British repression in the name of ‘upholding law and order’. He wrote to the Prime Minister as well imploring her to lift the emergency or at least release the political prisoners, particularly JP. In reply, he was referred coolly to JP having had no scruples in joining hands with the ultra-right wing Hindu nationalist forces (the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) and the ultra-left wing Maoist groups (Communist Party-Maoist-Leninist) and condoning violence. In response, Alexander endorsed the US-Based Committee for Freedom in India and supported the protest walk organised by the Committee in September 1976, from Independence Hall in Philadelphia to the UN in New York. His influence, alongside that of other such Western friends of her father, has been pointed out among the reasons Indira Gandhi lifted the domestically unpopular and internationally criticised imposition of internal emergency.

After her defeat in the general elections of March 1977, Morarji Desai, the new Prime Minister, was also a man after Alexander’s heart insofar as nuclear disarmament was concerned and the Quakers felt encouraged. Lately, Alexander had been disappointed with India’s participation in international affairs. Unlike the Nehruvian days of non-alignment—days of ‘difference, conviction and authority’—Alexander increasingly felt that ‘for some years now, the voice of India in the UN has counted for very little’. But he and others did not feel as sanguine about the ‘Indian bureaucracy which like in every country, really remains in control. And that bureaucracy has not really changed since Mrs Gandhi’s demise and is hovering over the possibility of India’s becoming a nuclear power.’
Indira Gandhi returned to power in January 1980 and remained the Prime Minister of India till her assassination in October 1984. She honoured Alexander with the Padma Bhushan (‘the Order of the Lotus’) medal in January 1984, the second highest civilian award that the Government of India bestows upon a non-citizen. Alexander, who had shifted to Swarthmore, Pennsylvania (US) in 1969, outlived her by five years. He turned one hundred in 1989, the year of centenary celebrations of his friend Jawaharlal Nehru in India, whom he outlived by twenty-five years. It was also the last year when a Gandhi, Rajiv (Nehru’s elder grandson), was the Prime Minister of India. He was a chip off the old block in at least one sense: like Alexander, he too held dear the vision of nuclear disarmament and a world free of the arms-race. Thus, fittingly Alexander’s six-decades-long association with Indian affairs began and ended with a Gandhi who was pacifist in his own way.

NOTES

1. Eleanor Roosevelt, Pearl S. Buck, Dorothy Norman and Norman Cousins in America and Kingsley Martin, Isobel Cripps, Edwina Mountbatten and Agatha Harrison in Britain may be mentioned as other such ‘friends of India’.


5. Agatha Harrison (1885–1954), a close friend of Mahatma Gandhi, was the first secretary of the India Conciliation Group. A great believer in the importance of ‘personal encounters’, she understood both sides, the Congress and the British Government, and the wider implications of their conflict well enough to be considered as ‘uniquely qualified’ as a go-between.


8. There is a mountain of material on the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. For a concise early account of the origins of the trouble see Birdwood, C., Two Nations and Kashmir, London: Robert Hale, 1956.


13. Popularly known as ‘Deen-bandhu’ in India, Charles Freer Andrews (1871–1940), a social reformer and Christian missionary with the Cambridge Brotherhood and the Church of England, was perhaps Gandhi’s closest friend. He arrived in India in 1904 to teach Philosophy at St Stephen’s College (Delhi) and was later instrumental in persuading Gandhi to return with


15. Fritz Berber, a Bavarian Methodist from Munich, was first a student and then a close associate of Alexander’s at Woodbroke from 1926 onwards. See the appendix, ‘Fritz Berber in the Second World War’, in Carnall, *Gandhi’s Interpreter*, pp. 63-66.


17. Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) was a literary figure and poet of world renown who became the first non-European to win the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1913. He was also a painter and a music composer and founded the Visva-Bharati University in Santiniketan. Known as Gurudev, his compositions were chosen as national anthems by two nations: *Jana Gana Mana* by India and *Amar Shonar Bangla* by Bangladesh.


26. Carnall, *Gandhi’s Interpreter*, p. 120.


29. See the chapter ‘To India with the Friends’ Ambulance Unit’, in Carnall, *Gandhi’s Interpreter*, pp. 151–71.


33. Popularly known as RAB, Butler had an old India connection. The son of Sir Montagu Butler, he had been born there and rose to become the Under Secretary at the India Office at the age of 34 in the Stanley Baldwin government in mid-1930s.

34. C. Rajagopalachari (1878–1972) was a lawyer-activist of the Indian National Congress who became the first Governor General of independent India. A close associate of Gandhi, his daughter married Gandhi’s youngest son, he had a long career in governance, upheld the cause
of disarmament and was called ‘the keeper of my conscience’ by Gandhi. See Gandhi, R., Rajaji: A Life, Delhi: Penguin, 1997.


37. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah (1905–82) was the founder-leader of the National Conference, the largest political party in the-then princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. He became the Prime Minister of the state from 1947–53 and later Chief Minister from 1977-82. Known as the ‘Lion of Kashmir’ he was a close friend of Nehru.

38. HGA to Noel-Baker, 2 March 1948, Temp. MSS 577/83a.


40. HGA to Paul Sturge, 29 April 1948, FSC/IN/17, Friends Service Committee Papers, Friend’s House

41. HGA to Agatha Harrison, 9 August 1948, FSC/IN/19.

42. HGA to Karlin Capper Johnson, 3 March 1951, FSC/IN/19.

43. HGA to I Gal, 24 July 1950 and HGA to Agatha Harrison, 5 August 1950, FSC/IN/19.

44. Carnall, Gandhi’s Interpreter, p. 223-28.

45. Carnall, Gandhi’s Interpreter, p. 229.

46. HGA to Agatha Harrison, 30 March 1951, FSC/IN/19.


49. Carnall, Gandhi’s Interpreter, p. 234.


51. HGA to Noel-Baker (in reply), 4 May 1954, Temp. MSS 577/90.

52. Carnall, Gandhi’s Interpreter, p. 235.

53. Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy (1892–1963) was a Muslim League politician from Bengal who became the Chief Minister of Bengal in 1946–47 and, after partition, rose to become the Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1956–57. Oxford-educated Suhrawardy was the Minister of Civil Supplies in Bengal in 1943–44 during the famine years when Alexander was engaged there in relief and rehabilitation.

54. Note by HGA on the American–Pakistan negotiations, 31 December 1953, FSC/IN/19.

55. HGA to Agatha Harrison, 26 February 1954, FSC/IN/19.

56. HGA to Roderick, 13 September 1954, FSC/IN/19.


58. Carnall, Gandhi’s Interpreter, p. 236.

59. HGA to Amrit Kaur, 21 February 1957, Temp. MSS 577/37/2.

60. HGA to Isobel Cripps, 9 February 1955, 971/1/2/7, Temp. MSS 971.


62. Ikramullah to HGA, 1 November 1955, Temp. MSS 577/36.

63. Nehru to HGA, 4 December 1955, No 2259-PMH/55, FSC/IN/19.

64. HGA to Elmore Jackson, 18 December 1955, 971/1/4/14, Temp. MSS 971.

65. Indira Gandhi was to put these global strategic interests in perspective when she wrote to Alexander in 1965 about the Indian fears that Kashmir would become a ‘hot-bed of intrigue’ for the USA, UK, China and the USSR—apart from Pakistan. Kashmir’s borders touched those of the latter three. Indira Gandhi to HGA, 24 May 1965, Temp. MSS 577/60.

66. Carnall, Gandhi’s Interpreter, p. 250.


68. Grace Lankester to HGA, 8 April and 12 April 1956, 971/1/4/14, Temp. MSS 971.

69. Lord Birdwood to HGA, 11 April 1956, Temp. MSS 577/36.


71. Grace Lankester to HGA, 16 November 1956, Temp. MSS 577/36.
72. Sir Olaf Kirkpatrick Caroe (1892–1981) joined the Indian Civil Service in 1920. Obtaining a transfer to the Indian Political Service, he rose to become the Chief Secretary of the North–West Frontier Province in 1933 and Foreign Secretary to Government of India’s External Affairs Department in 1939. He was Governor of the North–West Frontier Province from March 1946 to June 1947. He wrote several books in retirement like *The Soviet Empire* (1953) and *The Pathans* (1958).

73. HGA to the Editor, *The Times* (November 1956), Temp. MSS 577/36.
74. HGA to the Editor, *The Times* (November 1956), Temp. MSS 577/36.
75. Benjamin Polk and Eric Tucker to HGA, 10 April 1956, Temp. MSS 577/34.
76. Chester Bowles to HGA, 25 January 1956, Temp. MSS 577/34.
77. HGA to Elmore Jackson, 21 November 1956, Temp. MSS 577/36.
78. Grace Lankester to HGA, 29 November 1956, Temp. MSS 577/36.
79. HGA to Elmore Jackson, 1 February 1957, Temp. MSS 577/36.
83. HGA to Amrit Kaur, 21 February 1957, Temp. MSS 577/37/2.
84. Amrit Kaur to HGA, 27 February 1957, Temp. MSS 577/37/1.
85. HGA to Amrit Kaur, 19 March 1957, Temp. MSS 577/37/1.
86. Suhrawardy to HGA, 10 February 1957, Temp. MSS 577/37/2.
87. Elmore Jackson to HGA, 26 February 1957, Temp. MSS 577/37/1.
88. Elmore Jackson to HGA, 1 March 1957, Temp. MSS 577/37/2.
89. HGA-Nehru talks, 5 July 1957, Temp. MSS 577/40.
90. HGA to Elmore Jackson, 24 March 1957, Temp. MSS 577/37/1.
96. Richard Harris to Stella Alexander, 26 January 1963, Temp. MSS 577/44.
103. Indira Gandhi to HGA, 24 May 1965, Temp. MSS 577/60.
105. Widely known as JP, Jayaprakash Narayan (1902–79) was a freedom fighter and social activist. A member of the Congress Socialist Party, JP retired from active politics in early 1950s and devoted himself to public service for which he won the Ramon Magsaysay award in 1965. He returned to the political arena in the early 1970s when he led the students’ movement in Bihar which broadened into a national movement against the imposition of emergency by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. JP gave the slogan of Total Revolution and was instrumental in the formation of the Janata (People’s) Party which defeated Indira’s Congress Party in the 1977 elections.
108. Morarji Desai (1896–1995) became the first non-Congress Prime Minister of India in 1977. A Congressman from 1930, he had held many portfolios in Nehru’s cabinets and before
that had been the Home Minister and Chief Minister of Bombay in the 1950s. Like Alexander, he was also interested in nuclear disarmament in the 1970s.

109. Lal Bahadur Shastri (1904–66) came from Nehru’s province, the UP. He held many ministries under Nehru and succeeded him in June 1964 as India’s second Prime Minister. He led India during the 1965 war with Pakistan and negotiated the Tashkent Agreement with the Pakistani President Ayub Khan in January 1966. His sudden death in Tashkent cut short his 17-month-long Prime Ministership and led Indira Gandhi to power.

110. HGA to TN Kaul, 21 July 1975, Temp. MSS 577/78.

111. Indira Gandhi to HGA, 23 December 1975; Sharda Prasad to HGA, 16 September 1976, Temp. MSS 577/78.

112. Guha, India After Gandhi, pp. 520–21.


114. Homer A. Jack to HGA, 24 January 1978, 971/1/6/1, Temp. MSS 971.


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