The Embodiment of Seventeenth Century Quakerism: an Exercise in Historical Anthropology

Peter Collins
Universiy of Durham

Quaker Studies 4(1999)113 -141

Abstract
In this paper I begin by presenting a condensed narrative of 'the Nayler affair' which I then subject to an investigation relying on recent theories of the body. Focusing on the work of Foucault, Bourdieu and Goffman I reexamine the events which constitute this narrative by juxtaposing interpretations of the individual body of James Nayler, the body of seventeenth century Quaker faith and practice and the wider social body which framed and was framed by such accounts. The objective of the paper is not to achieve explanatory closure, but rather to provide an alternative lens through which to view Quaker history.

Keywords
The Body; Embodiment; Historical anthropology; James Nayler; Quakerism; Seventeenth century.

The Quaker Jesus Indicted by Parliament
In December 1656, after ten days of debate the Second Protectorate Parliament resolved:

> That James Nayler be set on the pillory, with his head in the pillory, in the New Palace, Westminster, during the space of two hours on Thursday next and shall be whipped by the hangman through the streets, from Westminster to the Old Exchange, London, and there likewise to be set on the pillory, with his head in the pillory for the space of two hours, between the hours of eleven and one of Saturday next, in each of the said places wearing a paper containing an inscription of his crimes; and that at the Old Exchange his tongue shall be bored through with a hot iron; and that he be there stigmatised in the forehead with the letter B; and that he be afterwards sent to Bristol and conveyed into and through the said city on a horse, bare-ridged, with his face backwards and there also publicly whipped the next market day after he comes thither; and that from thence he be committed to prison in Bridewell, London, and there restrained from the society of all people and kept to hard labour till he shall be released by Parliament; and during that time be debarred from the use of pen, ink, and paper; and shall have no relief but what he earns by his daily labour.[1]

Nayler and Quakerism[2]
James Nayler was a Cavalry Quartermaster in Cromwell's army and became a prominent Quaker during the early 1650s. Arriving in the capital early in 1655, he was soon held in great esteem by London Quakers and became a leading spokesman for the movement there. He answered critics deftly and published a stream of pamphlets in defence of Quakerism, reaching a peak of productivity in 1656. Opposition focused on him and soon the strain began to show. It seems that he was particularly disturbed by comments made by the Baptist preacher, Jeremiah Ives, who pressed him on at least two occasions to 'show a sign' proving the authority of his calling.

In June 1656 a split began to open amongst Friends[3] in London provoked by a small, enthusiastic group of zealots including Martha Simmonds and Richard Rich, whose admiration of Nayler began to take the form of adulation. The new faction began to disrupt Quaker meetings rather as Quakers disrupted services in the established church. Several prominent Friends and others responded by denouncing 'Simmonds' group' publicly. She turned to Nayler and was shocked when he seemed to side with her critics. Nayler became withdrawn when she rebuked him for his unfairness, and retired to Simmonds' house in order to reflect on recent events. Friends became increasingly concerned over the hold she seemed to have on him; at least one accused her of sorcery.[4]

Nayler agreed to discuss matters with George Fox (then in gaol in Launceston), who was generally regarded as the leader of the movement, and who continued to issue a plethora of directives to Friends everywhere. Nayler's journey was interrupted by the local authorities who were arresting all Quakers travelling through Devon. He and his companions were sent back to Exeter where they were imprisoned (not before being fined for refusing to remove their hats in front of the judge).

Problems in London continued unabated. Nayler, by refusing to renounce Simmonds' group was now firmly associated with them in the minds of many. Rumours circulated, exacerbating the threat of disruption or even schism. After securing Nayler's release, Simmonds went on to Launceston Gaol to berate Fox enthusiastically. Fox, increasingly disturbed by what he saw as a rival faction, eventually met with Nayler in Exeter in September. He admonished Nayler and his followers and was shocked when they failed to remove their hats when he prayed. From this point on the personal conflict between Fox and Nayler deepened, growing decidedly acrimonious. In the meantime Nayler's supporters praised him in increasingly extravagant terms, one claiming that he was the 'Only begotten Son of God'; another telling him, 'Thy name is no longer James but Jesus'.

Nayler was provoked into action: there would be a 'sign' indicative of the validity of his Quaker calling. He and six disciples embarked on a unique pilgrimage to Bristol. Nayler rode at the front of the group while the women of the party preceded him, spreading their garments in his path and singing 'Holy holy holy Hosannah!' The other two men rode behind on horseback with women on foot behind each. The sign had apparently taken the form of Christ's triumphant entry into Jerusalem. They processed in this manner through the centre of the town. Eventually they were hauled in by the local magistrates and examined in the presence of many of the city's clergy.

Although Nayler and some of his followers clearly did not believe him to be Christ, his examiners were only too willing to interpret the evidence otherwise.[5] Several of the group, however, appeared to claim that he was

Quaker Studies 4 (1999):113-141

indeed Christ. Dorcus Erbury offered testimony which proved very damaging, claiming, 'He is the only begotten son of God...I know of no Saviour but him', adding that he had raised her from the dead in Exeter gaol. Simmonds volunteered that although Nayler was not yet Christ he soon would be: the ultimate statement of ultimate perfectibility (Bittle 1986:108). The magistrates were not interested in the finer points of Quaker theology but intent on condemnation. They discovered a copy of a letter on one woman containing a description of the physical appearance of Christ, which an eye witness remarked had been mimicked by Nayler in every possible respect.[6] The magistrates, who had for some time been irritated by the presence of increasing numbers of Quakers in the town, requested their local representative to petition Parliament to take up the case. He presented a strong case which appealed to others ready to crush this infuriating sect.

Nayler and the Second Protectorate Parliament[7]

When Nayler entered Bristol the newly established Instrument of Government, in effect the Constitution of the new Parliament, was already in place and included guidance on religious toleration. Shortly after its settlement, news of the Nayler affair reached the House and a committee of members was appointed to consider the matter and promptly summoned the accused for examination. The committee agreed that the offence fell under one of two articles: 'First, Nayler did assume the gesture, words, honour, worship, and miracles of our blessed Saviour; Secondly, the names and incommunicable attributes and titles of our blessed Saviour.'[8] The ensuing debate was of such significance that Thomas Carlyle dubbed this, only partly in jest, 'the Nayler Parliament'.[9]

The debate was intricate and lasted ten days. Although no Member spoke in Nayler's favour, several sought to moderate the demands of others. He was eventually brought to the bar and examined by the House, where he refused to kneel or remove his hat. He agreed again to the description of the Bristol events and answered in the orthodox Quaker fashion, though denied that the women worshipped him.

According to Bittle (1986: chapter 6) the debate had two emphases: first, the issue of religious toleration. The 1650s was a time of increasing

toleration, partly due to Cromwell, who was on good terms with Quakers. However, he was critical of their tendency to disrupt church services and their belligerent attitude towards the clergy and civil officers of the Commonwealth and had issued a proclamation to prevent such behaviour in February 1655. Second, a complex of issues relating to procedure and jurisdiction: this was a period of considerable constitutional confusion and the relationship between the Protector and Parliament was by no means clear.

The punishment for blasphemy was at that time a short term of imprisonment; no-one convicted of blasphemy was tortured or sentenced to death.[10] Nayler's behaviour was unusual but far from unique and it is unlikely that his action seriously contravened existing law. He should have been protected by the guarantees of the Instrument. Nayler was, however, charged with 'horrid blasphemy' and ministers were sent to persuade him to recant.

Most factions were divided on the issue of the death penalty and those in favour were not simply a bunch of intolerant Presbyterians (Bittle 1986:159). Members were well aware of the disruptive influence of Quakers on public life. Numerous pamphlets had appeared denouncing the Quakers' precepts and activities. Many of these emphasised their attitude toward the magistracy, clergy, and others of rank as a levelling tendency. Quakers were already infamous for their opposition to tithes: a direct attack on property. The overall climate of the times provided a background against which these Quaker tendencies took on an added significance and perhaps menace: anti-government plots were rife and many thought the Millennium imminent. Quakers had been accused as Jesuits, Ranters, Levellers and virtually every other dangerous tendency. Several Members considered Nayler a symbol of a larger threat and spoke against a lighter punishment, referring not so much to Nayler as to the sect to which he belonged. As Bernard Church of Norwich put it: 'The Quakers are not only numerous but dangerous, and the sooner we put a stop, the more glory we shall do to God and safety to this Commonwealth' (Bittle 1986:128).

It is evident that Quakerism as such was the real defendant, along with the principle central to the Instrument: liberty of conscience. Skippon commented at one point, 'God deliver me from such liberty' (ibid:121). Nayler appeared before Parliament not simply as a man who, many believed, had engaged in gross blasphemy but as the symbol, even the leader of, the entire Quaker movement. As such he further symbolised the danger to religion and society posed by the liberty of conscience provision of the Instrument. He was the rotten fruit nurtured in the soil of religious toleration - and sufficient cause for its abandonment.

Fox petitioned Members defending the principle of the Inward Light, that is, the movement itself, not Nayler in particular. On the tenth day, the House was asked to vote on Nayler's execution, and voted against 96-82. The House erupted with suggestions for lesser punishments. One argued that as he wore his hair long in imitation of Christ, it should be cut off; this idea was rejected because the majority felt that such a punishment would constitute an admission that there was in fact such a resemblance; the Presbyterians were unwilling to accept that Christ wore his hair long! An extraordinary range of punishments, including various forms of torture and varying lengths of imprisonment, was suggested before the final resolution was agreed upon.

Nayler was summoned to the House to be sentenced on the eleventh day of the case and although forbidden to speak was heard to say: 'God has given me a body; he shall, I hope, give me a spirit to endure it'.[11] After being whipped through the streets of London, a week's respite was granted. Three weeks after the boring/branding, the third act of the drama took place at Bristol where he was, once again, whipped through the streets, accompanied by supporters singing his praises. He was then returned to prison in London, where he remained for three years.

Cromwell had to admit, after the Nayler case, that the Instrument was redundant. Packe's remonstrance proposed a return to two Houses. The Lower House immediately established a more strictly defined policy of toleration. Articles 10 (against the disturbance of services) and 11 (compliance with a confession of faith) were probably written with Nayler and Quakerism in mind. Bittle avers that the immediate

consequences of Nayler's conduct on the Quaker movement were largely negative. However, while Nayler's fall prejudiced the immediate work of Friends, it was probably functional to the movement's survival in the long run.[12] After 1656, Quakerism progressed steadily from charisma to routine:

> Quakers ceased to indulge in miracles or even discuss them, the individualistic appeal was de-emphasised, organisation and discipline received more emphasis.[13]

It is not a criticism of Nayler's several biographers to say that they do not and cannot tell the whole story: all interpretations are necessarily partial. Nor is it helpful to assume closure where there can be none. We could, of course, investigate various aspects of the affair but I intend to focus on just one: the Quaker body.[14]

Disciplining the Body

How prominent, in all this, is the *body* of Nayler: it was an intensely corporeal affair. The case might be said, in more ways than one, to embody the relationship between Quakerism and the Commonwealth. For Foucault, the significance of the body is determined by social structures.[15] Foucault is primarily interested in how bodies are constituted, monitored and controlled by discourse.[16] He has called his work a 'history of bodies', which seeks to map the relations which exist between the body and the effects of power upon it. The body does not merely reveal discourse but constitutes the link between the practices of everyday life on the one hand and the large scale organisation of power on the other (Shilling 1993:75).

Foucault suggests that during the course of the seventeenth century there was a change in the target of discourse. Subjects were no longer formed by discourses which directly constituted the body as flesh but, increasingly, by those which indirectly controlled the body by constructing it as a 'mindful body'. The mindful body is more than the fleshy object its predecessor was, defined through its possession of consciousness, intentions and language. It is controlled less by brute force and more by surveillance. Foucault further argues that discourse (which always connotes power) is inscribed on the body, which gives rise to a

rather straightforward idea: the punishment of Nayler is a late attempt by the state to map out the prevailing structure of power on the body of one evidently rebelling against it. The body of Nayler represents the body of rebellion: to crush one is to crush the other. Foucault would probably hold that England in the 1650s was at the cusp of two competing discourses and it was this ambivalence which gave rise to the lengthy debate concerning Nayler's punishment: the question was, 'what to do with the body?'

By the mid seventeenth century, according to Foucault, we had in the West become 'confessing animals' - we found ourselves with a duty to explore our own identity, the workings of our inner selves, the temptations to which we were exposed, the sins we may have committed.[17] This intense and revelatory reflexivity means that we entered an epoch in which we were obliged to tell these things to other people, and therefore to bear witness against ourselves. A politics of the body, an 'anatomopolitics', had emerged - the 'confessed' body had become an epistemic object of social concern and governmental manipulation, including constant surveillance.

The same epistemic phase witnessed the fabrication of the disciplinary individual within the context of the 'carceral society'. Imprisonment came to replace public humiliation and torture as the typical mode of punishment (Foucault 1979:15). The timing and exact nature of the historical disjuncture or 'break' he describes is contested. Interestingly enough, Foucault offers 1656 (the opening of the General Hospital in Paris) as a landmark of 'The Great Confinement', primarily a response (both economic and moral) by the authorities (across Europe) to begging and vagrancy (Foucault 1971). Sectaries were imprisoned in the earlier decades of the seventeenth century (under the Vagrancy Act), but only after 1660, following the diminution of religious toleration, were Quakers incarcerated in vast numbers - under more specific legislation.[18] In any case, this criticism really says no more than that Foucault paints with a broad brush, that in his universalising approach details are blurred. Although a public suspicious of sects often gave Quakers severe beatings, the State had ceased to mete out exquisite torture and had chosen instead incarceration.[19]

It is 'discipline' that is the keystone of the new discourse. The mid seventeenth century was a time when 'liberty' and 'discipline' were in mighty tension. Cromwell was for Tolerance but could not tolerate the rebelliousness and even revolutionary fervour of the sects - of which Quakerism was considered the most dangerous (Acheson 1990: 69-74; Hill 1975: Chapter 10; Reay 1984). A plethora of legislative measures was passed during the 1650s and 1660s which set out to improve the surveillance of sectaries as they moved around the country - and even to prevent such movement[20] - and this process was in operation during the later years of the Commonwealth; at the same time legislation was introduced which empowered informants to report on illegal gatherings.[21] The point is, the episteme which Foucault labels the 'disciplinary' (marked specifically by surveillance) came into place at precisely that point when the Monarchy had fallen - as Foucault's theory might predict. as in the French case, on which Foucault focuses his attention, sharp transition from Monarchy to Republic prompted a shift in the means of punishment.

Why then the dreadful torture and public humiliation of Nayler? The marked constitutional confusion of 1656 was magnified when Nayler's case was brought before Parliament and gave rise, in part, to the ambivalence concerning its outcome. His body was inscribed with what might be seen as overlapping discourses leading to an ambiguity manifested, for instance, in the wildly varying suggestions regarding the eventual punishment. To that extent the Nayler affair might be presented in support of Foucault's thesis.

Supposing his characterisation of the carceral society is correct and that, in England, it was emerging during the seventeenth century, Quakers might then be seen to be an organised force of motivated individuals bent on bringing about the new episteme. The new discourse, founded in the Protestant work ethic was particularly prominent in the faith and practice of Quakers - they were about to found their own schools, build their own factories, introduce rational trading facilities and would be among the first to implement the new psychiatry.[22] If Quakerism went hand in

glove with the new discourse, again, how can we explain the fall of Nayler?

Foucault directs our attention not only to the body but also to the soul: in the carceral society punishment no longer stops at the body but rather manipulates the body in order to discipline the soul (1979:16). But it could be argued that the worst punishments meted out during the Inquisition and during witchcraft trials in England and elsewhere were enacted in order to draw out first confession, then repentance (Thomas 1971). After he had been found guilty, Parliament immediately sent a delegation to Nayler's cell in order to encourage him to recant. Emphasis did not, in any simple way, shift suddenly from 'the body' to 'the mind/soul' - the body had always been the means of access to the soul.

More importantly, we might ask whether there is room for cultural specificity in Foucault's analysis, or for the play of competing agendas at the macro level (the State) or the micro level (the individual)? Is it really sufficient to explain away this affair in terms of something as abstract, external, deterministic and universalising as 'discourse'?[23] In what other ways might the punishment of Nayler exemplify the embodiment of seventeenth century Quakerism? With this question in mind I shall turn, now, to the work of Pierre Bourdieu and return to Quaker faith and practice.

Nayler and the Quaker Habitus

Can we typify the Quaker milieu in which James Nayler played such a significant part? Originally a part of a larger religious ferment involving Familists, Behmenists, Ranters, Seekers, Muggletonians and others, Quakerism had become, by 1652, a distinctive movement - primarily due to the organising ability of Fox.[24] Quakers were highly critical of the Established Church, defining themselves in opposition to it. The genius of early Friends was to translate the developing doctrine of the Inward Light (worked out in detail by Robert Barclay in his Apology of 1672 and most often justified by citing John 1:1-9) into a workable and as it turned out, durable faith and practice.

In order to illuminate the social context of Quakerism I turn to that elusive notion which lies at the heart of Bourdieu's theory of practice: the habitus. In a nutshell, the habitus is a set of embodied, largely unconscious dispositions, through which individuals both structure, and are structured by, the world. The habitus provides individuals with class-dependent, predisposed ways of relating to and categorising situations.[25] The nature of habitus is revealed by the way people treat (and present) their bodies. This is evident in even the most unconscious gestures and the seemingly most insignificant techniques of the body - ways of standing and walking, one's manner of eating and so on, all of which demonstrates, according to Bourdieu, the most fundamental principles of construction and evaluation of the social world. Damrosch (1996:35) describes concisely the bearing of seventeenth century Quakers:

> When not immediately inspired by the spirit, Quakers were given to a gravity of demeanor that struck many contemporaries as an affectation of moroseness.

Habitus as process produces a common sense world in which individuals agree, consciously or unconsciously, on the meaning of practices; it harmonises peoples' experiences and expectations, continuously reinforcing their individual and collective expression. The continuity and homogeneity of the habitus is what causes everyday life to be immediately intelligible and foreseeable, and therefore taken for granted. Seventeenth century Quakers became a close-knit, disciplined and highly organised group. Without segregating themselves completely, they did become increasingly inward-looking and self-referential, living in a world within a world - a habitus within a habitus.[26]

There is, also, a spatial aspect to the habitus. According to Bourdieu, it is in the relationship between the body and a space structured according to fundamental oppositions (e.g. male/female, low status/high status) that one discovers a dialectical and generative relationship between the body and its environment (Bourdieu 1977:89). In his study of the Kabyle (a Berber group), the house as a centre of social interaction, above all, is the principal locus for the objectification of these generative schemes. We would therefore anticipate that the meeting house might have a similar role in relation to the Quaker habitus.[27] Certainly, their form of worship

was distinctive, first taking place in public spaces or the homes of Friends and by 1700 more often in purposely built meeting houses. The environment of the meeting house ensured a typical orientation of the body of the participant, the theological implications of which might only have been worked out in terms of practice by many ordinary Quakers - that is, through the imitation of others. The buildings were plain, unadorned with the usual symbols of the Church (there were no crucifixes, saints, altars, pulpits, fonts); they were not cruciform in plan, neither were they oriented along an east/west axis. Along the wall facing the entrance was a bench where ministers sat; the rest of the congregation sat on facing benches. Their liturgy was minimalist: Friends sat still and in silence until one amongst them was called upon by God to speak.

Meeting for worship, in most places held at least twice a week, was the hub of the Quaker community. The relationship between the built environment of the meeting house and the physical orientation or disposition of adepts constitutes and is constituted by Quaker faith and practice. It is probable that ordinary Friends (unlike those extraordinary Friends, who are too often taken as ordinary, who read English and Latin, who travelled widely and wrote and published pamphlets) did not have a firm grasp of the nascent but steadily developing Quaker theology and became Friends *in Meeting* primarily by doing what others did.[28]

Worship is an embodied event. In attending meeting 'in person' Quakers sealed their fate - they would be counted as one of the 'peculiar people' both by insiders and outsiders. They implicitly agreed to abide by a discipline which often led to the loss of property and freedom: sufferings (the punishments sustained by Friends) were often of the body. In attending Meeting they were explicitly turning their backs on the Church and State thereby putting themselves beyond the pale of society. They defined themselves (as do we all to some extent) in opposition to others.[29]

How is the habitus (as a set of dispositions) transmitted from one individual to another, from one generation to another? Bourdieu argues that the child (and we might add, significantly, in this case, newcomers - those recently or yet to be 'convinced') imitates not 'models' but other peoples' actions and particularly those minuscule actions encapsulated in

his term 'hexis': a family of postures that is both individual and systematic.[30] Systematic because it is articulated with a wider system of techniques involving the body, in relation to the built environment of the meeting, itself charged with a host of social meanings and values. In the stillness and silence of meeting for worship Friends were particularly attentive to the gestures and postures which, in their eyes, expressed everything that went to make an adept, accomplished - a way of sitting and standing, a tilt of the head, facial expressions, tone of voice, a style of speech, even a certain subjective experience. Although such imitation may be unconscious, the acquisition of the habitus is not simply a matter of mechanical learning by trial and error. Quaker worship, the encapsulation of Quakerism, is better understood as 'gestalt', something learnt as a whole. Nayler was an adept par excellence, indeed he had been instrumental (as a leading 'London Friend') in developing this 'gestalt'.

Right practice was acquired through watching (and listening to) one's peers. We will see how minutes sent down to local meetings perpetually stressed the importance of ensuring the assimilation of the Quaker habitus by the young. The newly convinced were likely to conform if they wanted to remain part of the group. For poor Quakers conformity brought undoubted financial benefits. Meeting was fundamentally levelling. If the Light of Christ was in everyone then no one person could raise themselves above any other - this bears on the dispute between Fox and Nayler and the eventual isolation of the latter.[31] In Meeting any person may stand and minister at any time, regardless of social status - including that defined by gender. This belief was considered particularly reprehensible and standing before Parliament Nayler was standing for the right to hold such beliefs. The non-hierarchical nature of Meeting must have impressed itself on everyone who attended. They were constrained by no ecclesiastical orientation and at no point had their gaze drawn to one marked off and raised higher neither physically (by altar or pulpit) nor symbolically (by dress, worldly qualification or special language).[32]

Bourdieu believes a structural analysis of the social organisation of the internal space of the house enables us to understand the habitus objectified. Although this is rather limiting, it enables us to understand how the meeting house facilitates the Quakers' vision of the world: it is a

spatial text read with the body which, through movement, both makes and is made by the space. The Quaker meeting for worship was the most significant time and space in which the Quaker habitus was assimilated, probably in the most subtle of ways. Bourdieu (1977: 94) writes:

> Nothing seems more ineffable, more incommunicable, more inimitable, and, therefore, more precious, than the values given body, made body by the transubstantiation achieved by the hidden persuasion of an implicit pedagogy, capable of instilling a whole cosmology, an ethic, a metaphysic, a political philosophy...The whole trick of pedagogic reason lies precisely in the way it extorts the essential while seeming to demand the insignificant.

It is true that all religion is embodied in one sense or another. For example, gestures (during liturgy, say) represent or symbolise the beliefs of the adept. In Quakerism this embodiment is particularly important because of the absence of a creed - one might almost say that embodied worship of a particular kind functions as a creed. When rowdy gangs broke into meetings smashing bodies along with benches, it was the form of worship they wished to disrupt and ultimately prevent. The (theological) position of Friends was less important than its practical (and embodied) outcome i.e. the manner of their social presence - their worship was directly comprehended as a dangerous social and political criticism - of tithes, of the clergy, of the Church which Quakers saw as irrelevant, rapacious and oppressive: Quakers were *different* and therefore dangerous. Their central belief (made manifest both in their preaching and in their mode of worship), that there is something of God in everyone, had ominous political overtones.

The habitus, according to Bourdieu, tends towards reproducing existing social structures. This is problematic in the case of dissenting movements, such as Quakerism, which seeks to 'turn the world upside down' rather than reproduce it. But Bourdieu (1977: 94) goes further:

> The principles em-bodied in this way are placed beyond the grasp of consciousness, and hence cannot be touched by voluntary, deliberate transformation, cannot even be made explicit.

Despite the force of his rhetoric, I am not convinced by this (it is not so dissimilar to Foucault's account of 'discourse' and equally deterministic) - the point about the Quaker habitus is that it was generated by individuals consciously setting out to establish the Kingdom on Earth - in direct opposition to the 'ways of the world' - it is likely that the habitus, in its finer detail is more likely to be caught than taught, but to imagine that the whole gamut of faith and practice was assimilated unconsciously is nonsensical. It is not sufficient to say, as Bourdieu does repeatedly, that the habitus is the product of 'History' - it is, rather, the product of individuals in interaction. We can agree that Nayler had assimilated a 'system of dispositions' which was identifiably Quaker, but his decision to enact these dispositions in the way he did was in no way a necessary effect of adopting them.

As Bourdieu describes it, the habitus is overly deterministic and fails to characterise, adequately, the role of the corporeal body. Finally, it is evident that Quakerism is emergent in interaction, and is not merely a given, merely a set of dispositions predetermined by the habitus. Quakers were perfectly aware that their meetings, during which social hierarchy was made redundant, epitomised a radical standpoint which directly called into question the legitimacy of the established order. This levelling tendency (reviled during Nayler's trial) was foregrounded again, in the testimonies, particular in the testimony to plainness and we shall go on, now, to consider dress and gesture in particular - the embodiment of the plain.

The Quaker Habitus as Interaction Order

The Quaker habitus, although most evident in and around the meeting, could never be co-terminus with any one place. If we accept, as Bourdieu says, that the Quaker habitus is embodied then it must manifest itself whenever and wherever Quakers engage with others - and this was the case. Quakerism defined itself and was defined by others in public, within what Erving Goffman (1983) calls 'the interaction order' i.e. the domain of face-to-face interaction. Quakers could be identified almost immediately as such, by their dress, their language, their gestures. For a

man like Nayler, Quakerism touched every aspect of his life - it was not something hived off from the rest of his social being.[33]

As Bourdieu points out, 'the unifying principle of practices in different domains...is nothing other than the habitus.'[34] The unifying principle which Quakers sought to embody was the plain. William Penn wrote in 1669 (*Quaker Faith and Practice* para 20.29):

> Some are so taken with themselves it would seem that nothing else deserved their attention. Their folly would diminish if they could spare but half the time to think of God, that they spend in washing, perfuming, painting and dressing their bodies...

According to Bourdieu (1977:94):

> If all societies...that seek to produce a new man through the process of 'deculturation' and 'reculturation' set such store on the seemingly most insignificant details of dress, bearing, physical and verbal manners, the reason is that, treating the body as a memory, they entrust to it in abbreviated and practical (mnemonic) form, the fundamental principles of the arbitrary content of culture.

But these details, Goffman reminds us are, in the first place made meaningful in interaction and in the second place grounded in moral commitment (Rawls 1987:147).

In order to maintain the solidarity and ensure the continuity of the group Fox and others began work, early, on the standardisation of Quaker practice. Up until 1656, advice was disseminated in a more or less ad hoc manner throughout the movement. By 1656, 'discipline' (the term coined by seventeenth century Friends for the formal expression of their faith and practice) could no longer be left to chance. Fox established an organisational structure through which an increasingly precise and formalised discipline might percolate.[35] Codification, Bourdieu notes, is important because it ensures a basic minimum level of communication, it makes things simple, clear, communicable; it makes possible a controlled consensus of meaning. One of the virtues of formalisation is that, like all

rationalisation, it allows for an economy of invention, improvisation and creation. In 1655-56 Fox was pressing on with this project, a project interrupted by the charismatic or overly dramatic performance of Nayler and his followers.

In literate societies, the habitus (codified as it is) provides an objective basis for regular modes of behaviour, and thus for the regularity and predictability of modes of practice. However, the habitus also allows for a measure of indeterminacy which means that one cannot depend on it entirely in critical, dangerous situations. Thus one can better understand the stream of minutes outlining the burgeoning Quaker discipline. Bourdieu formulates the general rule that the more dangerous the situation is, the more the practice tends to be codified; the degree of codification varies in proportion with the degree of risk (1990:76-86). In relation to the plain, innumerable prescriptions and proscriptions were circulated to Meetings (at various levels), for example from the epistle of London Yearly Meeting, 1691 (Epistles, 1818):

> And that Friends take care...to keep the truth and plainness, in language, habit, deportment and behaviour; that the simplicity of truth in these things may not wear out nor be lost in our days, nor in our posterity's...and to avoid pride and immodesty in apparel, and extravagant wigs, and all vain and superfluous fashions of the world.

Minutes like this touched (more or less consistently) on every aspect of life (and death: coffins, apparel, gravestones), so for the sake of brevity as well as heuristics I shall focus on the specific issues of dress and gesture. I turn, also, to Goffman at this point in order to establish the performative nature of the Quaker habitus. Goffman's theory of 'the interaction order' is an important attempt to understand the ways in which individuals control and monitor their bodies. (Shilling 1993:87). Like Bourdieu, (though unlike Foucault), Goffman takes seriously the idea that the body is a physical component of human agents.

There is a certain similarity between Bourdieu's notion of habitus and Goffman's interaction order, whose conventions and rules our behaviour will be expected to respect; for Goffman it is a moral order. The

conventions of the interaction order extant in the mid seventeenth century remained anchored in a social hierarchy which coloured and was precipitated by every social encounter. Quakers were reviled for flouting these conventions, which they did consciously, publicly and often outrageously.[36] Goffman would argue that it is in these very interactions that Quakerism is constituted. Remember Nayler's appearances before Parliament: it is difficult, now, to imagine how shocking it must have seemed to Members of the House, even those familiar with the Quaker testimonies, that a man should refuse to kneel and remove his hat in such a place, at such a time. But by 1656, it could be argued that Friends were engaged in establishing an interaction order founded on different principles. In order to make these principles evident, Friends utilised what Goffman refers to as 'body gloss' - through practice they made their faith as explicit as they could. Let me turn to my two examples.

First, I shall consider plain dress. In an epistle of 1654 Fox wrote: 'Do not wear apparel to gratify the proud mind...' Such counsel was codified (in the sense given the term by Bourdieu) and formalised as the system of sending 'advice' down first from Yearly Meeting to regional Quarterly Meetings, then to Monthly Meetings and finally to local Preparative Meetings as they became established. It is difficult to do justice to the quantity of these minutes or the increasing attention they paid to minute details of dress. Yearly Meeting minutes often advised on dress (well into the nineteenth century) - especially in relation to the education of children:

> And when you see a libertine wanton spirit appear in your children or servants, that lusteth after the vain customs and fashions of the world, either in dressings, habits, or outward adornings, and craves your assistance and allowance, without which it cannot get forward, while they are under your government; O then look to yourselves, and discharge your trust in God, and for the good of their souls, exhorting in meekness, and commanding in wisdom; that so you may minister and reach to the Witness, and help them over their temptations, in the authority of God's power.[37]

Bourdieu argues that the habitus is constituted precisely through the establishment of such dispositions as 'a feel for the game', assimilated by children and adults through their repeated experience of meeting (1990:76). It is the precondition for the co-ordination of practices and also for practices of co-ordination. The corrections and adjustments which adepts themselves consciously carry out presuppose their mastery of a common code. Collective action requires a certain degree of harmony between the habitus of the mobilising agents and the dispositions of those whose aspirations and worldview they express.

These testimonies to plain dress clearly served to separate or mark off Friends from 'the world'. As symbols of identity and belonging, they were central to the definition of the Quaker habitus. In an age when communication remained largely face to face, it was imperative that the (clothed) body of the adept should speak of his of her spiritual condition. Within Quakerism, public opinion confined the ministry and other services of the Church to those who adopted the Quaker attire and other conventions; and if one of the 'gay' (worldly) Friends entered on a more serious way of life the change was marked by the adoption of the 'plain' dress and manner. Plainness was a disciplinary and internal hierarchising force in more ways than one. Nayler's very presence, epitomising the plain as he did, would have signified dissent.

Secondly, let us consider gesture or 'manners'. Soon after Thomas Ellwood's conversion to Quakerism in 1659 he met some old school friends. They saluted Ellwood in the usual way, removing their hats and bowing and saying, 'Your humble servant, sir.' To their surprise, he stood without moving his cap or bending his knee, until realisation dawned and one of them remarked, 'What, Tom, a Quaker?' 'To which', says Ellwood, 'I readily and cheerfully answered, 'Yes, a Quaker.'[38] Ellwood's father reacted violently to his son's adoption of Quaker behaviour (Braithwaite 1912:491-92).

Clearly, 'taking up the cross' of Quakerism with regard to such matters as the plain dress and hat-honour involved very real separation from the world. At a time when people did stand on ceremony Quaker plainness seemed not only ill-bred but deliberately offensive. The hat was at this

time commonly worn in church, but not during prayer nor in the presence of superiors. Lord Clarendon says that in his younger days he never kept on his hat before his elders (except at dinner), nor during grace (Braithwaite 1923:493). To be uncovered before anyone was a distinctive mark of deference and while critics naturally found it easy to ridicule this side of Quakerism - Richard Baxter calls these things 'silly cavills' - the position taken by Friends on points of behaviour embodied central tenets of their faith. The testimony of plainness (in dress, manners, speech and so forth) simultaneously defined one's identity as a Quaker and one's separation from the world. These were potent symbols.[39] Such 'witness' was necessarily made manifest, even constituted during social interaction - this is why we should not ignore Goffman.[40]

However, conceptualising Quakerism as an interaction order, though interesting, has certain weaknesses. Citing Goffman's analysis of stigma (1968), Shilling (1993:87) points out that the body management of individuals within the bounded sphere of the interaction order appears to be detached from the wider social norms of body idiom, that is, the classifications which categorise people's bodily performances exist prior to and are independent of social encounters. This dualism leads to two problems: first, Goffman tends to underestimate the macro-structural implications of his view of the body (issues that Foucault certainly cannot be said to ignore); second, given the importance he attaches to social classifications in labelling and grading the body, Goffman, it might be argued, falls foul of the familiar old determinism: he is ambiguous on the matter of agency, but in any case the significance of the body is determined by sources (either shared vocabularies of body idiom or discourses) external to the body and out of reach of the individuals subject to them. As with Foucault, the mind becomes the site in which the meaning of the body is inscribed.

I would not go as far as Shilling and in my view, Goffman is rather less prone to such determinism (in his treatment of the body) than either Foucault or Bourdieu. Both Crossley (1995) and Rawls (1987) defend Goffman against criticisms such as Shilling's saying that if we understand the interaction order as *sui generis*, then the supposed dualism (of individual and social structure) inherent in his theory disappears. Our

consideration of seventeenth century Quakerism may shed light on this question. It is not difficult to see how the particular interaction order we have been describing fits with a wider social order: it does so through opposition. The mode of self-presentation adopted by Quakers was determined primarily by the need to oppose and reject the status quo. In a sense, Nayler's escapade epitomised the extremes to which this opposition was taken and, because of its extremity, it most clearly delineates (brings into stark relief, as it were) the social structure it sought to attack.

Concluding Discussion - Going Naked as a Sign

Let us return specifically to the political, social and religious context in which Nayler lived his Quakerism. 'Publishing the truth' (proselytising) was a central Quaker activity at this time, and in the absence of other means of communication (apart from the pamphlet), Friends testified in person and in public. In 1652 Fox wrote approvingly to the people of Ulverstone of the most extreme form of this testimony:

> ...the Lord made one of you go naked among you, a figure of thy nakedness, and of your nakedness, and as a sign amongst you before your destruction cometh, that you might see that you were naked and not covered with truth.[41]

For Friends (and others), the Bible had come to provide an endless source of metaphor and as familiarity with the book grew so the meaningful connection between 'sign' and textual reference became increasingly implicit.[42] Pamphleteers antagonistic to Quakerism regularly cited details of such cases. Such testimonies were more frequent during the early years of the movement than has commonly been allowed. According to Braithwaite (1923:150) going naked as a sign was not disowned by the Quaker leaders and both Fox and Nayler, defended the practice, arguing that such prophets only undertook the service under a strong sense of religious duty.[43] Solomon Eccles (1663) writes, 'I have strove much, and besought the Lord that this going naked as a sign might be taken from me, before ever I went as a sign at all (in Penney 1907:66).' They felt themselves to be the prophets of a new religious era and we can recognise the spirit of obedience which lay behind it, and its naturalness under the circumstances, the habitus of the first Friends.

Significantly, Nayler says that the Friends who acted in this way acted contrary to their own wills; on the other hand, the wild prophecies and notions of James Milner had been condemned by Fox, because he believed they were prompted by the earthly nature - this is a crucial distinction.[44] Regarding Nayler's sign, Fox and Nayler agreed absolutely on the criteria of authenticity but not on the final interpretation.

It is in this light that Gwyn (1995:175-87) understands the actions of Nayler in Bristol. Gwyn suggests that Nayler's act was not that of a misguided zealot, but 'a measured, sacrificial response' to the prevailing political climate: a crucial battle in the 'Lamb's War'. Nayler's entry into Bristol, like Jesus of Nazareth's entry into Jerusalem, represented the conscious decision to make explicit and resolve the contradiction between entrenched political, religious and economic interests on the one hand, and a radical, grassroots movement promoting fundamental social change on the other. Gwyn's argument has particular resonance given the fact that the sign was enacted at the very time Parliament was considering whether to crown Cromwell king. Friends were aware of and intensely critical of these developments and called on Cromwell to 'lay thy crown at Jesus' feet'. Nayler's symbolic enactment of Christ having come in the flesh of common people to teach and lead them affirmed the 'Son of Man' tradition Jesus had embodied.[45]

If Gwyn is right, the Nayler affair - in all its corporeality - brought the Quaker critique of the State to a head at the crucial moment when the resurgence of hierarchical rule had to be challenged decisively. The rulers in London as in Jerusalem he argues, were forced to deal earnestly with one who embodied a dangerous and potentially uncontrollable social movement: the body of Nayler, constructed in and through the Quaker habitus, was duly inscribed, through his torture, with the authority of State. But by incarcerating him, the State brought about his incorporation rather than his rejection: Quaker opposition ceased to be radical. I find Gwyn's argument plausible and believe that it is considerably strengthened by contemporary theories of the body.[46]

This paper has three broad aims: first, to shed some light on one extraordinary event in Quaker history, 'the Nayler affair', a story oft

told though rarely theorised. Second, in focusing on the body/embodiment, I have attempted to ground the affair within what is possibly the most fertile perspective in contemporary social theory. In doing so I have adopted an epistemological pragmatism which some might consider positively promiscuous. This has been necessary in so far as no single theory is adequate to account for a complex moral economy involving relationships between individuals, between individuals and society, between institutions and society and so on. Finally, in focusing my theoretical endeavour on seventeenth century material, I intend to provoke discussion between scholars working within a common substantive field (Quaker studies) but often isolated within their own academic disciplines. Peter Burke (1992:1-3) has lamented the lack of communication between historians and social scientists, characterising their relationship as 'a dialogue of the deaf'. My hope is that this paper will generate greater dialogue between these and perhaps other overlapping disciplines.

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my colleague Dr James Carrier and the participants of the Seventeenth Century Seminar at Durham and both anonymous referees for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

Notes
1.Bittle 1986:131-2.
2. The details of 'the Nayler affair' are drawn primarily from Bittle (1986), Brailsford (1927) Damrosch (1996) and Fogelklou (1931). A concise account can be found in Chapter 11 of Braithwaite (1912).
3. The term 'Friend' was used at least as early as 1652 (Braithwaite 1923:73); 'Quaker' was at first a derisive term in common usage in the 1650s (Braithwaite 1923:57). The terms are now largely synonymous.
4. The specific question of gender in relation to Nayler's 'followers' is examined in Trevett (1991:29-42).
5. This evidence included letters found in Nayler's possession.
6. This letter was said to have been sent to the Roman senate by the president of Judea around the time of the crucifixion.
7. Unless otherwise stated all page references in this section are from Bittle (1986). I would say that Bittle is better on the political aspects of the trial while Damrosch (1996) is more interesting regarding its theological and more broadly religious aspects.

8. Quoted in Bittle 1986: 117.
9. Quoted in Bittle 1986: 118.
10. Under the Blasphemy Act of 1650. This act, says Damrosch (1996:196) 'had never been more than sporadically enforced, and many magistrates virtually ignored it.'
11. Quoted in Bittle 1986:133.
12. Braithwaite (1923:271) says:

> But while Nayler's fall prejudiced the work of Friends in the various ways which I have indicated, its most lasting result was good, for it effectually warned the Quaker leaders of the perils attending the over-emphasis which they had laid on the infallibility of the life possessed by the Spirit of Christ'.

We should remember, however, that Braithwaite was a Quaker writing (like all historians) within a particular context of understanding and belief.
13. Chu, quoted in Trevett (1991:39). Braithwaite (1923:271) makes the same point.
14. There has been a considerable upsurge of interest in the body and embodiment amongst social scientists in recent years. For background reading see Shilling (1993) and Turner (1996). An earlier, brilliant account of the relation between the body and the body politic is Kantorowicz (1957). It might be argued that the work of Mary Douglas should feature centrally in any anthropology of the body. My reason for omitting Douglas is that I believe she has taken her approach as far as it can be taken. See Douglas 1973 (Chapter 5 in particular).
15. I refer, in particular, to Foucault 1979 and 1980:55-62.
16. For the philosopher-historian Foucault, 'discourse' refers to sets of 'deep principles' which comprise specific 'grids of meaning' which generate and underpin all human experience, even the most mundane and apparently trivial.
17. As Vann (1969:19-20) puts it, 'Friends shared the Puritan impulse to self-examination'.
18. Including The Quaker Act (1661), the first Conventicle Act (1664), the Five Mile Act (1665) and the second Conventicle Act (1670).
19. Other punishments included praemunire and most commonly fines and distraint of property. Besse (1753) is the locus classicus of Quaker sufferings.
20. For instance The Five Mile Act of 1665.
21. Damrosch pointing out the inherent conservatism of Parliament, quotes Morill thus (1996:304, footnote 13):

> The regimes of the 1650s were radical only in the circumstances that brought them into existence. In most other respects, there was

> a rush to restoration: a return to familiar forms of central and local government...the silencing of radical demands for land reform or greater commercial freedom...

And we would add of course 'religious toleration'.

22. The Retreat in York, established by Samuel Tuke, a Quaker, in 1796 and mentioned by Foucault (1972), typified the new discourse.

23. There is a certain irony in Foucault complaining that 'Marxism considered as an historical reality has had a terrible tendency to occlude the question of the body, in favour of consciousness and ideology' (1980:58-59).

24. 'Fox did not teach his followers a new set of concepts for talking about a universal experience; he introduced them to a new institution'. (Disbrey, quoted in Damrosch 1996:245). Braithwaite (1923: chapter 13; 1919: chapters 9 and 10) makes it clear that Fox was the organising dynamo during the first decades of the movement.

25. In this case 'group-dependent' might be a more accurate expression, though there is some evidence of socio-economic uniformity among seventeenth century Quakers:

> We know quite a lot about the social origins of the early Quakers. Although there was regional variation in the movement's social composition, it seems that it mainly drew its membership from what were known as the middle sort of people: wholesale and retail traders, artisans, yeoman, husbandmen. (Reay 1984:14)

See also Braithwaite (1923:512). For substantial detail see Vann (1969: chapter 2).

26. This introversion became all the more marked during the eighteenth century as the movement ceased to expand and Quakers sought to protect 'the precious remnant'. Describing the (ever tightening) Discipline as a 'hedge' Isaac Fletcher, yeoman, wrote in his diary:

> the Society [of Friends] encamped in the wide extended plain of the world, under the direction and sole command of their great Captain & Leader, & surrounded as it were in their tents with the impregnable walls of their Discipline. (Winchester 1994:xxi).

27. In relation to the first decades of Quakerism we should refer to 'meeting place' in that legislation made the building of meeting houses illegal. Friends met in one anothers' homes, in fields and occasionally in buildings adopted for the purpose - the 'Bull and Mouth' in Aldersgate in London being a prime example. Only after the Toleration Act of 1689 were Quakers freely allowed to build meeting houses.

28. Bourdieu (1977:88) argues that the habitus is 'acquired through sheer familiarization', that is, by imitation.

29. This opposition was frequently alluded to by Members of Parliament during the trial. See Bittle (1986) for details.

30. See Bourdieu 1977: 82, 87 and 93-4, for further brief elaborations of the meaning of hexis.

31. Damrosch (1996:143-46) is quite definite on this point. There was an incident when Fox commanded Nayler to kiss his foot - a perfect example of the embodiment of hierarchy: Nayler refused.

32. In relation to the levelling language adopted by Quakers see Bauman (1983: chapter four).

33. Jenkins (1992:70) observes that Bourdieu's central metaphor of 'the feel for the game' bears some similarity to Goffman's metaphor of social life as theatre or game. Each depends on a view of individuals as subtle learners of appropriate behaviour. During the first fifty years of Quakerism, appropriate behaviour became increasing prescribed.

34. Echoes of Mary Douglas (1970:100) here: 'the style appropriate to a message will co-ordinate all the channels'.

35. Though clearly this was not something that Fox achieved alone. For concise accounts of the organisation of early Quakerism see Braithwaite 1923, chapter 13 and Vann 1969, chapter 3.).

36. Though that is not to say that seventeenth century Quakerism was a perfectly egalitarian movement. See Trevett (1991) for an account of the role of women in the Society of Friends during this period.

37. From the Yearly Meeting Epistle of 1688 (*Epistles* 1681-1817, 1818)

38. *Quaker Faith and Practice* para 19.16, from *History of the Life of Thomas Ellwood*, ed. by C.G. Crump 1900:23-24.

39. A point appreciated by historians such as Hill (1962:371).

40. Furthermore, Crossley (1996:141) makes the salient point that, for Goffman, action is 'other oriented' - nothing could be truer of Nayler's behaviour throughout the 'affair'.

41. Quoted in Braithwaite (1923:148). See also Penney (1907:364-369) for a brief and Carroll (1978) for an extended discussion of this phenomenon.

42. In some cases it is evident that the meaning of the sign, while perfectly clear to the 'performer' might remain wholly obscure and therefore possibly abominable, to the audience - as in the case of Nayler's entry into Bristol.

43. See also Bittle (1986:37-38).

44. And an important criteria that Quakers used in distinguishing themselves from, for instance, Ranters. See McGregor (1977).

45. See also Damrosch (1996): 163-176. Damrosch argues similarly but emphasizes the mystical/theological over and above the political significance of Nayler's ride through Bristol.

46. Gwyn shows considerable empathy with seventeenth century religious thinking - as Damrosch (1996:11) says:

> For them religious language and political language ran in tandem. They did not always run comfortably, and the points of friction and blockage are of particular interest, but that should not lead us to conclude that one language was the real one and the other a mere mask, or at best a historically dated misunderstanding that can be dispelled by translating it into other terms.

References

Acheson, R.J. *Radical Puritans in England 1550-1660.* London: Longman, 1990.

Barbour, H. and Roberts, A.O. *Early Quaker Writings 1650-1700.* Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1973.

Bittle, W.G. *James Naylor 1618-1660. The Quaker Indicted By Parliament.* York: William Sessions, 1986.

Bourdieu, P. 'The Berber House'. In Douglas, M., ed., *Rules and Meanings.* Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973:98-110.

-----. *Outline of a Theory of Practice.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

-----. *In Other Words. Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology.* Cambridge: Polity, 1990.

Bourdieu P. and Wacquant, L.J.D. *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology.* Cambridge: Polity, 1992.

Brailsford, M. Richmond *A Quaker From Cromwell's Army: James Nayler.* London: The Swarthmore Press, 1927.

Braithwaite, W.C. *The Beginnings of Quakerism.* Cambridge University Press, 1923.

-----. *The Second Period of Quakerism.* London: Macmillan, 1921.

Burke, P. *History and Social Theory.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Burns, T. *Erving Goffman.* London: Routledge, 1992.

Calhoun, C., LiPuma E. and Postone M., eds., *Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives.* Cambridge:Polity, 1993.

Quaker Studies 4 (1999):113-141

Carroll, K.L. 'Early Quakers and "Going naked as a Sign"'. *Quaker History* 67(1978):69-87.

Crossley, N. 'Body Techniques, Agency and Intercorporeality: On Goffman's *Relations in Public*'. *Sociology* 29(1995):133-149.

Damrosch, L. *The Sorrows of the Quaker Jesus: James Naylor and the Puritan Crackdown on the Free Spirit.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996.

Disbrey, C 'George Fox and Some Theories of Innovation in Religion'. *Religious Studies* 25(1989):61-74.

Douglas, M. *Purity and Danger. An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966.

-----. *Natural Symbols. Explorations in Cosmology.* London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1970. Second Edition.

Epistles from the Yearly Meeting of Friends, Held in London...from 1681-1817 Inclusive. London: W & S Graves, 1818.

Featherstone, M., Hepworth, M. and Turner, B.S., eds., *The Body. Social Process and Cultural Theory.* London: Sage, 1991.

Fogelklou, E. *James Nayler: The Rebel Saint, 1618-1660.* Trans. Lajla Yapp. London: Ernest Benn, 1931.

Foucault, M. 'Body/Power'. In Foucault, M., *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, ed. by Gordon, C. and Trans. by Gordon, C. et al. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992:54-62.

-----. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison.* Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979.

-----. *Madness and Civilisation: a History of Insanity in the Age of Reason.* London: Tavistock, 1971.

Goffman, E. *Stigma: Notes on the Management of a Spoiled Identity.* Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968.

-----. *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life.* Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990.

-----. 'The Interaction Order', *American Sociological Review* 48 (1983):1-17.

Gwyn, D. *The Covenant Crucified. Quakers and the Rise of Capitalism.* Wallingford, Pennsylvania: Pendle Hill Publications, 1997.

Hill, C. *Society and Puritanism in Pre-Revolutionary England.* Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962.

-----. *The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution.* Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975.

Jenkins, R. *Pierre Bourdieu.* London: Routledge, 1992.

Kantorowitz, E. *The King's Two Bodies. A Study In Medieval Political Theology.* Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 1957.

Manning, P. *Erving Goffman and Modern Sociology.* Cambridge: Polity, 1992.

McGregor, J.F. 'Ranterism and the Development of Early Quakerism,' *Journal of Religious History* 9(1977):349-363.

-----. 'Seekers and Ranters,' in McGregor, J.F. and Reay, B. eds., *Radical Religion in the English Revolution.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984:121-139.

Merquior, J.G. *Foucault.* London: Fontana, 1985.

Morton, A.L. *The World of the Ranters: Religious Radicalism in the English Revolution.* London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1970.

Nickalls, J.L. ed., *Journal of George Fox.* London: Religious Society of Friends, 1975.

Penney, N. ed., *First Publishers of Truth, being Early Records of the Introduction of Quakerism into England and Wales.* London: Headley Brothers, 1907

Rawls, A. 'The Interaction Order Sui Generis: Goffman's Contribution to Social Theory'. *Sociological Theory* 5(1987):16-149.

Reay, B. 'Quakerism and Society,' in McGregor, J.F. and Reay, B. eds., *Radical Religion In the English Revolution.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984: 141-164.

Shilling, C. *The Body and Social Theory.* Sage: London, 1993.

Shilling, C. and Mellor, P.A. 'Embodiment, Auto/Biography and Carnal Knowing: The Protestant Reformation and Modern Self Identities'. *Auto/Biography* 3:1 &3:2(1994):115-128.

Thomas, K. *Religion and the Decline of Magic.* Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971.

Trevett, C. *Women and Quakerism in the 17th Century.* York: William Sessions, 1991.

Turner, B.S. *The Body and Society.* Second Edition. London: Sage, 1996.

Vann, R.T. *The Social Development of English Quakerism, 1655-1755.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969.

Winchester, A.J.L. ed., *The Diary of Isaac Fletcher of Underwood, Cumberland, 1756-1781.* The Cumberland & Westmoreland Antiquarian and Archaeological Society. Extra Series XXVII, 1994.

Peter Collins is interested in various aspects of religion. He has published a number of articles on Quakerism and is currently working on an